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Abstract. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database (CVE) is one of the 
largest publicly available source of software and hardware vulnerability data and 
reports. In this work we analyze the CVE database in the context of IoT device 
and system vulnerabilities. We introduce a real-world based classification of IoT 
systems. Then, we employ a SVM algorithm on selected subset of CVE database 
to classify "new" vulnerability records in this framework. The subset of interest 
consists of records that describe vulnerabilities of potential IoT devices of differ-
ent applications, such as: home, industry, mobile controllers, networking, etc. 
The purpose of the classification is to develop and test an automatic system for 
recognition of vulnerable IoT devices and to test completes, sufficiency and reli-
ability of CVE data in this respect. 
Keywords: Internet of Things, IoT security, system vulnerability classification, 
CVE, NVD, SVM. 
1 Introduction and Background  
1.1 IoT Architecture – Outline 
IoT can be most broadly defined as an interconnection of various uniquely addressable 
objects through communication protocols.  Narrowing down the above said, we can 
describe it as a  communication system paradigm in which the objects of everyday life, 
equipped with microcontrollers, network transmitters, and suitable protocol stacks that 
allow them communicate with one another and, via ubiquitous cloud infrastructure and 
also with users, become an integral part of the Internet environment [1]. 
Here, we will consider an IoT model consisting of three major levels: 
 Perception and execution layer, which encompasses a wide range of "smart" 
devices ranging from RFID and NFC enabled tags, environmental sensors and 
actuators, various home appliances, mobile terminals, smart phones, etc. This also 
includes a wide range of industry SCADA devices and smart vehicle components, 
ubiquitous in today’s vehicles (cars, trucks, etc.). A separate role must be at-
tributed to controllers or managing stations used both in home and industrial ap-
plication. A controller is simply a PC, a tablet or a mobile phone used to manage 
local IoT infrastructure, and to visualize data.  
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 Network layer which provides heterogeneous communication infrastructure 
based on multiple network standards such as: s Wi-Fi, 3G/LTE, Z-wave, ZigBee, 
6LoWPAN, VLC, mIP [2] and Ethernet together with the standard internet pro-
tocol suite (IPv4 / IPv6 and transport layer UDP/TCP stack). 
 Cloud or application layer which integrates, manages and analyzes data from 
IoT devices. The cloud not only gathers data and manages the "things" and "core" 
layer, but acts as a ubiquitous service provider for end-users, according to the 
Service Oriented Approach (SOA) paradigm. 
 The above IoT model is compatible with the reference architecture model proposed 
by the EU FP7 IoT-A project [3] and the IoT-A tree structure [4]. 
1.2 IoT Applications 
IoT is widely, although mostly anecdotally, known as a network of household appli-
ances – from PC equipment and peripherals to fridges, coffee machines, etc. However, 
the scope of IoT deployments is much wider, and covers the following areas [1,5,6,7]: 
 Smart Cities – building structural health monitoring, noise mapping, traffic con-
gestion monitoring and "smart roads"; smart lighting; waste management. 
 Smart environment – weather monitoring; disaster early warning systems, e.g. 
flood detection and volcano monitoring); water quality monitoring; chemical 
leakage and pollution level detection. 
 Smart agriculture and farming – fertilizer, pesticide and irrigation monitoring, 
crop level monitoring; hydroponic plant monitoring and control; animal tracking. 
 Smart Grid – electrical energy consumption monitoring and management. 
 Manufacturing – this covers a wide range of industry process control systems – 
mechanical, chemical, etc. This range of applications is often referred to as IToT 
(Industrial IoT); the systems themselves are referred to as SCAD (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition). 
 Industrial Security and sensing – gas level and leakage detection in industrial en-
vironments, radiation level measurement. 
 eHealth – patient surveillance and assistance in medical facilities. 
 Home automation ("Smart homes") – energy and water use monitoring, remotely 
controlled appliances, door cameras, locks, alarms, etc. 
 
1.3 Security issues with IoT systems 
Security issues with IoT environments have been widely discussed and publicized. 
In some cases, when the compromised system was widely used, for example as com-
modity type home appliance, or when the effects of security exploitation where widely 
conspicuous (e.g. in the case of Mirai botnet [8]) the awareness of IoT insecurity has 
even reached general public.  
We can distinguish two general kinds of IoT threats: 1. threats against IoT and 2. 
threats from IoT. 1 Threats against IoT occur when a flaw in an IoT device or appli-
cation, on the perception, network or cloud level is exploited by the hacker, and the 
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device or application is compromised - i.e. a full or limited access to its functions and 
data is gained by an attacker. 2 In case of threats from IoT, the compromised infrastruc-
ture is used to conduct various attacks against IoT or Internet-connected devices. Again, 
the Mirai botnet can serve as an example - when a multitude of compromised webcams 
and other devices were used to conduct a massive DDoS attack. 
In [9] the authors have proposed five "dimensions" relating to IoT security:  hard-
ware, operating system/firmware, software, networking and data: 
 Hardware security is critical when an attacker can physically access the device.  
Through the hardware backdoors, software level integrity checking can be by-
passed by disabling the checking functionality or booting via forged firmware. 
Almost all IoT devices have hardware vulnerabilities which may be exploited (see 
a reference database - [10]). The vulnerability list mechanisms include, but are 
not limited to: debugging ports, multiple boot options, and unencrypted flash 
memory [11]–[13]. Microcontrollers (MCUs) which are broadly used in industry 
applications (SCADA) as well as in automobiles and home automation are also 
prone to hardware level vulnerabilities. This includes for example attacks against 
EEPROM contents via JTAG/SPI ports, clock glitch attacks which have been 
shown to compromise AES encryption via fault injection techniques [14] 
 Operating system, firmware and software security and privacy - relates to all 
three IoT layers: perception, network and cloud. Software security issues are sim-
ilar to those in the traditional computer systems. Trustworthy operating systems 
should be used at the perception layer to reduce the risk of remote compromise. 
However, in practice, this is rarely the case. The controller application is often 
installed on a PC or a smartphone and software secure measures should be applied 
in order to prevent the attack against it. The cloud layer security also cannot be 
blindly trusted, for example: servers installed on Amazon EC2 are secured from 
the cloud provider’s point of view, but not from the point of view of installed 
application and have to be secured by whoever deploys the servers. Other soft-
ware level security risks specific to the IoT environments described recently in-
clude for example: public and private SSL key pairs discovered by  static analysis 
on a large number of unpacked firmwares; a large-scale automated dynamic anal-
ysis using the Metasploit Framework of various firmwares was conducted and a 
large number potential exploits were discovered [15]; a buffer overflow exploit 
(which can be used to execute any code on the device) was found by analyzing 
Home Network Administration Protocol (HNAP) [16]; stack-based buffer 
overflow of the general library glibc [17] was exploited to attack several home 
hubs [18]. 
 Network Security and Privacy - as a networked system a whole IoT environ-
ment has to be secured from end to end. Encryption and authentication should be 
used consistently, but often is not. Two functions specific to home IoT devices 
are pairing and binding. In the pairing process the controller needs to connect to 
the IoT device in order to configure the "thing". Most SOHO IoT devices allow 
any controller in proximity to conduct pairing with no additional security 
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measures. This may be acceptable in home environment, but in a large-scale de-
ployment in a public environment anybody with access to the devices can 
reconfigure and break into the system. The binding process starts after pairing 
succeeds and establishes necessary access credentials for the thing in order to 
control it. Week passwords are one of the typical security issues in this phase. 
Many manufacturers fail to provide necessary protection for their networked IoT 
devices, the above quoted Mirai attack being just one of the examples of weak 
password exploitation. Many attacks relating to binding have been analyzed and 
described, for example for: wearable devices [19], surveillance camera systems 
[20], Phillips Hue light bulb system [21], etc. 
 Cloud and data - the cloud collects data from the perception layer, and is respon-
sible for maintaining proper data security. The cloud often handles authentication 
and associated services and is a peer in end-to-end encryption of transmitted data. 
Application compromised on the cloud level exposes a significant amount or per-
haps the whole of the collected data.  However, big data collected by the cloud 
can also help to increase security. For example, it can be used to distinguish be-
tween legitimate and illegal usage patterns, it can also prevent (at least to some 
extent) DDoS attacks. 
 
To summarize this section: the majority of security problems emerging in today’s 
IoT systems result directly from buggy, incomplete or outdated software and hardware 
implementations. A major protocol flaw design error (such as Heartbleed [22] and 
DROWN [23]) are much rarer. As can easily be verified in public domain vulnerability 
databases, the number of products reported with serious security flaws is growing year 
by year.  
1.4 Scope of this work and related research 
In this work, we propose a classification of device-related (i.e. not “pure software”) 
vulnerability data for IoT and IIoT equipment. We have divided the CVE records from 
a public database into 7 distinct categories (e.g.: home equipment, SCADA devices, 
network infrastructure systems, etc.). The database samples were hand-classified by us 
based on the expert knowledge. We then used support vector machine (SVM) classifier 
on the device and vulnerability data to predict categories of “new” vulnerabilities – for 
example data from year 2017 was used to classify 2018’s data, etc. The purpose was to 
predict, and (if possible) prevent and mitigate threats resulting from new vulnerabilities. 
This is a difficult task given the size of the database and the rate of its growth – each 
day tens of new records are added to the CVE database alone. Hence, when a new 
vulnerability or exploit is discovered it is often critical to learn its scope by automatics 
means, as fast as possible. 
 There has been some prior research on automatic analysis and classification of vul-
nerability databases: In [24,25] models and methodologies of categorizing vulnerabili-
ties from CVE database according to their security types based on Bayesian networks. 
In [26] Topic Models were used to analyze security trends in CVE database with no 
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prior (expert) knowledge. Huang et. al. [27] proposed recently an automatic classifica-
tion of records from NVD database based on deep Neural Network, the authors com-
pared their model to Bayes and KNN models and found it superior. All of the above 
cited research was focused on categorizing software aspect of vulnerabilities, with cat-
egories such as for example: SQL injection, race condition, cryptographic errors, com-
mand injection, etc. According to our knowledge no prior work was done regarding 
categorizing of the impacted equipment: system or device – our work tries to address 
this gap. 
 This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the contents and struc-
ture of the CVE database; we also describe related: CPE (Common Platform Enumer-
ation) and NVD (Network Vulnerability Data) records. In section 3 we introduce our 
proposed classes of IoT devices; we discuss briefly SVM classifier methods and the 
measures we used to test classifiers quality. In section 4 we present the results of the 
classification. Our work is summarized in section 5. 
2 Structure and contents of CVE Database 
2.1 The Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) database 
The Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) database hosted at MITRE is one 
of the largest publicly available source of vulnerability information.  As the CVE’s 
FAQ [28] states: “CVE is a list of information security vulnerabilities and exposures 
that aims to provide common names for publicly known problems. The goal of CVE is 
to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, repos-
itories, and services) with this ‘common enumeration.” CVE assigns identifiers (CVE-
IDs) to publicly known It product vulnerabilities. Across organizations, IT-security so-
lutions vendors, and security experts, CVE has become the de facto standard of sharing 
information on known vulnerabilities and exposures. 
 In this work we use an annotated version of the CVE database, known as National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) which is hosted by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). NVD is created on the basis of information provided by MITRE 
(and through the public CVE site). NIST adds other information such as structured 
product names and versions, and also maps the entries to CWE names. NVD feed is 
provided both in XML and JSON formats structured in year-by-year files, as a single 
whole-database file and as an incremental feed reflecting the current year's vulnerabil-
ities.  
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> 
<nvd xmlns:scap-core="http://scap.nist.gov/schema/scap-core/0.1" 
xmlns:cvss="http://scap.nist.gov/schema/cvss-v2/0.2" 
xmlns:vuln="http://scap.nist.gov/schema/vulnerability/0.4" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" ...> 
 <entry id="CVE-2017-3741"> 
    <vuln:vulnerable-configuration id="http://nvd.nist.gov/"> 
      <cpe-lang:logical-test operator="OR" negate="false"> 
          <cpe-lang:fact-ref name= 
               "cpe:/a:lenovo:power_management:1.67.12.19"/> 
          <cpe-lang:fact-ref name= 
               "cpe:/a:lenovo:power_management:1.67.12.23"/> 
        </cpe-lang:logical-test> 
    </vuln:vulnerable-configuration> 
    <vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
      <vuln:product> 
          cpe:/a:lenovo:power_management:1.67.12.19</vuln:product> 
    </vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
    <vuln:cve-id>CVE-2017-3741</vuln:cve-id> 
    <vuln:published-datetime>2017-06-04T17:29:00.387- 
         04:00</vuln:published-datetime> 
    <vuln:last-modified-datetime>2017-06-13T13:13:17. 
         827-04:00</vuln:last-modified-datetime> 
    <vuln:cvss> 
      <cvss:base_metrics> 
        <cvss:score>2.1</cvss:score> 
        <cvss:authentication>NONE</cvss:authentication> 
        <cvss:confidentiality-impact>NONE 
           </cvss:confidentiality-impact> 
        <cvss:integrity-impact>PARTIAL</cvss:integrity-impact> 
        <cvss:availability-impact>NONE</cvss:availability-impact> 
      </cvss:base_metrics> 
    </vuln:cvss> 
    <vuln:cwe id="CWE-254"/> 
    <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="VENDOR_ADVISORY"> 
      <vuln:source>CONFIRM</vuln:source> 
      <vuln:reference href= 
          "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/ 
           LEN-14440" xml:lang="en">https:...//.../LEN-14440 
        </vuln:reference> 
    </vuln:references> 
    <vuln:summary>In the Lenovo Power Management driver before 
         1.67.12.24, a local user may alter ... This  
         issue only affects ThinkPad X1 ... generation.</vuln:summary> 
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  </entry> 
  </nvd> 
Fig. 1.  A single simplified NVD record from NIST CVE feed (some less relevant fields have 
been abbreviated or omitted). 
Fig. 1 contains a sample (simplified) record from the NVD database. Fields which are 
relevant for further discussion are as follows: 
 entry contains record id as issued by MITRE, the id is in the form: CVE-
yyyy-nnnnn (eg. CVE-2017-3741) and is commonly used in various other da-
tabases, documents, etc to refer to a given vulnerability 
 vuln:vulnerable-configuration and vuln:vulnerable-software-
list identifies software and hardware products affected by a vulnerability. 
This record contains the description of a product and follows the specifications 
of the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) standard. Because the vulnera-
bility’s scope may be complex – for example it may refer to a particular ver-
sion of software on a given hardware platform, the product description is for-
matted as a structured, logical, AND-OR expression.  
 cpe-lang - The basic record of vuln structure More information on CPE for-
mat will be provided in the next section. 
 vuln:cvs and cvss:base_metrics describe the scope and impact of the 
vulnerability. This data allows to identify real-world consequences of the vul-
nerability, that is its access-, availability- and confidentiality impacts. For ex-
ample it reports if the bug allows for remote system takeover, is it a data 
breach, etc. 
 vuln:cwe contains a reference to is a community-developed list of common 
software security weaknesses (CWE) [29]  database. CWE is hosted by 
MITRE and contains formal list of software weakness types. In simplest terms 
CWE ID identifies type of bug that caused the vulnerability. 
 vuln:references may contain URL providing additional information re-
garding the vulnerability. 
 vuln:summary holds a vulnerabilities short informal description. 
2.2 Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) 
CPE is a formal naming scheme for identifying: applications, hardware devices, and 
operating systems. CPE is part of the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 5 
standard [30], which was proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST). Here we will refer to the most recent version 2.3 of CPE. The CPE naming 
scheme is based on a set of attributes called Well-Formed CPE Name (WFN) [31]. The 
following attributes are part of this format: part, vendor, product, version, update, edi-
tion, language, software edition, target software, target hardware, and other (not all at-
tributes are always present in the CPE record, very often “update”, and the following 
ones are omitted from the record). Currently, CPE supports two formats: URI (defined 
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in CPE version 2.2) and formatted string (defined in CPE version 2.3). The CVE data-
base uses URI format and we will only discuss this format further on.  
For example: in the following CPE record cpe:/h:moxa:edr-g903:- the attrib-
utes are as follows: part:h (indicating hardware device), vendor:moxa, prod-
uct:edr-903, version, and the following attributes are not provided. As a second ex-
ample let us consider a complex vuln:vulnerable-configuration record – Fig. 2 
below. 
 
<vuln:vulnerable-configuration id="http://nvd.nist.gov/"> 
  <cpe-lang:logical-test operator="AND" negate="false"> 
  <cpe-lang:logical-test operator="OR" negate="false"> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name= 
        "cpe:/o:d-link:dgs-1100_firmware:1.01.018"/> 
   </cpe-lang:logical-test> 
   <cpe-lang:logical-test operator="OR" negate="false"> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-05:-"/> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-05pd:-"/> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-08:-"/> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-08p:-"/> 
   <cpe-lang:fact-ref name="cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-10mp:-"/> 
    ... 
  </cpe-lang:logical-test> 
  </cpe-lang:logical-test> 
</vuln:vulnerable-configuration> 
 
Fig. 2.  A vulnerable configuration record from CVE – a logical expression build from CPE 
identifiers. 
 
The record shown on Fig. 3 refers to particular operating systems version (firmware), 
namely: cpe:/o:d-link:dgs-1100_firmware:1.01.018 on a list of distinct 
hardware devices: cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-1100-05:-, cpe:/h:d-link:dgs-
1100-05pd:-, etc. CPE does not identify unique instantiations of products on systems, 
rather, it identifies abstract classes of products. The first component of the CPE de-
scriptor is “part” it can take the following values: a – for application, h – for hardware, 
o – for operating system. 
CPE records are maintained in a separate database “CPE Dictionary” [31] which is 
distributed in XML format, it contains product records with URL reference to product 
description – Fig. 1Fig. 3. 
 
<cpe-item name="cpe:/h:d-link:dap-1320:-"> 
  <title xml:lang="en-US">D-Link DAP-1320</title> 
  <references> 
    <reference href="http://us.dlink.com/products/access-points-
range-extenders-and-bridges/wireless-range-extender/">Vendor web-
site</reference> 
  </references> 
  <cpe-23:cpe23-item name="cpe:2.3:h:d-link:dap-1320:-
:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"/> 
</cpe-item> 
    Fig. 3.  A CPE record defining a named device. 
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2.3 Discussion 
The NVD database is distributed as XML and JSON feeds, it is also possible to 
download the whole historical data package (starting from 1999, but records compliant 
with the current specification are available for data generated since 2002).  In addition, 
there is also an on-line search interface. The database, as at the beginning of 2020 con-
tains over 120 000 records in total, and on the average the number of records increases 
year by year. Due to historical reasons – a long time-span of data collection it neither 
completely consistent, nor free of errors. Older records lack some information (for ex-
ample vulnerability score); URL in the reference field may be outdated; there are ap-
proximately 900 records without CPE identifier; there exists a large number of records 
with CPEs inconsistent or not present in the CPE dictionary (approx. 100 000 CPEs). 
In general, the binding between the vulnerability description and the product concerned 
may be problematic, because it is only provided by the CPE – for example there is no 
“plain language” product description, or classification present in the database. Product 
names containing non-ASCII or non-European characters also pose a problem, as they 
are recoded to ASCII often inconsistently or erroneously. 
Lack of record classification on the CVE or CPE level (except for the “application, 
OS or hardware” attribute in the CPE) is especially cumbersome, because there is no 
easy or obvious way to differentiate products. Essentially, it is impossible to extract 
data relating to, for example: web servers, home routers, IoT home appliances, security 
cameras, cars, SCADA systems, etc., without a priori knowledge of products and ven-
dors. 
3 CVE Data classification and analysis 
3.1 Data selection 
 For the classification purposes we have selected only records with the CPE “part” 
attribute set to “h” (hardware records), namely, the selection criteria was: if any of the 
records in vuln:vulnerable-configuration section contains CPE with part = 
=”h” then the record was selected for further consideration. Other records were dis-
carded. The reason is the following: all or most of the “hardware” type records refer to 
devices or systems which can potentially be a component of the perception or network 
layer of the IoT or IIoT architecture. We have also narrowed down the timeframe to 
data from years 2010-2019 (data from first quarter of 2019 was taken into account). 
Fig. 4 shows the number of all records from this time period. 
 Hand analysis of selected vulnerability data led us to a grouping of records into 7 
distinct classes as follows: 
 H – Home and SOHO devices; routers, on-line cameras and monitoring, other 
customer grade-appliances. 
 S – SCADA and industrial systems, automation, sensor systems, non-home 
IoT appliances, car and vehicles (subsystems), medical devices, industrial 
video recorders and surveillance systems. 
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 E – Enterprise, Service Provider (SP) hardware (routers, switches, enterprise 
Wi-Fi and networking) – this constitutes mainly the network level of IoT in-
frastructure. 
 M – mobile phones, tablets, smart watches and portable devices -  this consti-
tutes the “controllers” of IoT systems. 
 P – PCs, laptops, PC-like computing appliances and PC servers (enterprise) – 
this constitutes the “controllers” of IoT systems. 
 A – other, non-home appliances: enterprise printers and printing systems, copy 
machines, non-customer storage and multimedia appliances. 
 
 The reason for the above classification was practical – the key distinction for an IoT 
component in reference to its security vulnerability is the market and scope of its appli-
cation (home use, industrial use, network layer, etc.). On the other hand we are limited 
by the description of the available data – it would impossible to use a finer-grain clas-
sification. Also, it is not practical to introduce to many classes with small number of 
members, because the automatic classification quality suffers in such case (As we have 
in fact learned in same cases). Sample devices from NVD database are shown in Table 
1. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Number of “h” records classified in the time range of 2010-2019. TOT is the total num-
ber of records, other bars refer to assigned classes. Only the first quarter of 2019 was consid-
ered, hence a smaller record number. 
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Table 1. Devices from NVD database – samples from each of the proposed classes. 
Class Sample systems (vendor, name) Notes 
H 
 D-link Dir-815 
 Opticam i5 
 Meetcircle Circle With Disney 
 Amazon Amazon_key 
 
 Network & Wi-Fi router 
 Home surveillance camera 
 Parental control device 
 Home Access Device 
S 
 Siemens Sinumerik 828d 
 Yokogawa FCI 
 Mbusa cockpit 
 Vivotek camera 
 industrial machine tool controller 
 autonomous controller 
 car cockpit automation 
 surveillance camera 
 
E 
 Juniper SRX100 SRX110 
 CISCO staros asr_5000  
 Citrix Netscaler Gateway 
 Polycom QDX6000 
 Family of network firewalls 
 Router & access device 
 Network load balancing system 
 Video-conferencing system 
 
M 
 Samsung Galaxy S6 
 Amazon Kindle Fire 
 Mi mi router 3 
 Huawei Watch 2 
 
 Smart phone 
 Tablet / e-book reader 
 Portable Wi-Fi/LTE router 
 Smartwatch device 
P 
 HP integrated lights-out 
 HP nonstop_server 
 Intel  s7200ap 
 Server management module 
 Server platform 
 Server main board 
 
A 
 Drobo 5n2 
 TBK Vision tbk-dvr4216 
 Ricoh d2200 
 Enterprise data storage system 
 Enterprise DVR system 
 Enterprise Printing system 
 
3.2 Data analysis methodology 
 
We build classifiers by training linear support vector machines (SVM) [32] on the 
features of “hardware” vulnerability records extracted from the NVD database. The 
feature vector contains:  
 Vendor name, 
 product name and other product data from CPE (if supplied), 
 vulnerability description, 
 error code (CWE). 
The steps of the process of building a classifier are the following: 
 Preprocessing of input data (removal of stop-words, lemmatization, etc.), 
 feature extraction, i.e. conversion of text data to vector space, 
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 training of the linear SVM. 
 
We use a standard linear SVM, which computes the maximum margin hyperplane 
that separates the positive and negative examples in feature space. The classification 
based on a linear SVM generates the hyperplane that maximizes the distance of the 
most borderline training examples to the linear decision plane (or boundary). Alterna-
tive methods include: k-nearest neighbor, Bayesian classifiers and Neural Nets. We 
have conducted some experiments with Neural Nets, but finally decided to use SVM, 
as it proved itself to be: fast, efficient and well suited for text-data classification. With 
SVM method the decision boundary is not only uniquely specified, but statistical learn-
ing theory shows that it yields lower expected error rates when used to classify previ-
ously unseen examples [32,33]  - i.e. it gives good results when classifying new data. 
We have used Python 3.7.1 with NLTK 3.4.1 [34] and scikit-learn 0.21.3 [35] librar-
ies. NLTK was used to pre-process the text data, while scikit contains SVM algorithms 
together with tools for computing the classification quality metrics.  
3.3 Classification measures 
To benchmark classification result we use two standard measures: precision and re-
call. We define precision (eq. (1)) as a fraction of relevant instances among the retrieved 
instances; we define recall (eq. (2)) as the fraction of the total amount of relevant in-
stances that were actually retrieved. In other words: precision indicates the ratio of true 
positives to the sum of true positives and false positives, while recall is calculated as 
the ratio of true positives the sum of true positives and false negatives (elements be-
longing to the current category but not classified as such). Finally, as a concise measure 
of we will use the F1 score, also known as balanced F-score. The F1 score can be in-
terpreted as a weighted average of the precision and recall, where an F1 score reaches 
its best value at 1 and worst score at 0. The relative contribution of precision and recall 
to the F1 score are equal. The formula for the F1 score is given in eq. (3) 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)⁄  (1) 
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  𝑇𝑃 (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)⁄  (2) 
𝐹1 = 2 ∗  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛∗𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙)
  (3) 
4 Classification results 
4.1 Data selection and classification  
We have tested the classifier for historical data in one year intervals. For example, 
to classify data from 2018 we have used records from the following ranges: 2014-2017, 
2015-2017, 2016-2017 and 2017, etc. On Fig. 5 we show confusion matrices trained on 
data ranging from 2014 to 2017 used to classify data for 2018. From a good classifier 
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we would expect a majority of records on the diagonal. Here the classification is not 
perfect, for example - for training data from year range 2014-2017: 109 H type records 
were marked as E and 108 as S class; only 62% were correctly classified (recall). When 
only data from 2017 was used, perhaps surprisingly, the classification is more accurate: 
489 / 85% records of the H type were labelled correctly (recall); however for S and E 
classes only 55% were correctly identified. For classes with a low number of records 
(C, M, P) the classification falls below 50%. On Fig. 6. Precission and recall for 2018 
records based on training data from: 2014-2017, 2015-2017, 2016-2017 and 2017 (cat-
egory “A” was removed).  
 
  
  
 
Fig. 5.  Classification of records from 2018 based on training data from: 2017, 2016-2017, 
2015-2017 and 2014-2017 (left to right, top-bottom). Numbers show the number of records. 
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Fig. 6. Precission and recall for 2018 records based on training data from: 2014-2017, 2015-
2017, 2016-2017 and 2017 (category “A” was removed). 
Similar trends are visible for classified data from the first quarter of 2019 based on 
SVM trained on records from 2015-2018 range – for E, H and S classes precision is 
within the range of 70%-90% (with an exception of H class where it is only 44%), and 
recall falls in the similar range of 70%-90%. 
On Fig. 8 we have shown result for years 2015 and 2016 – for major classes the 
classification for years ranging from 2011-214 and 2017 also show similar trends. 
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Fig. 7.  Classification of records from 1st quarter 2019 based on data from: 2018, 2017-2018, 
2016-2018 and 2015-2016 (left to right, top-bottom). Numbers show the number of records. 
  
 
Fig. 8.  Classification of records from 2015 based on data from 2014 (left) and 2016 based on 
data from 2015 (right). Numbers show the number of records. 
4.2 Discussion 
As we have shown in the previous section, quality of classification results can be 
summarized as average. We were able to achieve 70-80% of correct labeling for the 
most populated classes of devices. In some cases the classification falls below 50%. 
Using more training data, i.e. going back in time does not always improve the classifi-
cation quality, on the contrary – in most cases it reduces it. 
To summarize the classification results for the whole period of 2011-2019(Q1): Fig. 
9 shows the values of F1 measure weighted by support (the number of true instances 
for each label). Because of the weighing, this shows the quality of classification for all 
classes. As shown, the balanced F1 score varies between 50% and 72%. 
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Fig. 9.  F1 score for records from 2011 to 2019(Q1). 
5 Summary 
We have proposed a classification of IoT device related vulnerability data from the 
public CVE/NVD database. We have divided vulnerability records into 7 distinct cate-
gories: Home and SOHO, SCADA, Enterprise & Networking, Mobile devices, PC de-
vices and other non-home appliances. The hand-classified database samples were used 
to train a SVM classifier to predict categories of “new” vulnerabilities. 
The purpose of the automatic classifier is to predict, and (if possible) in subsequent 
steps - prevent and mitigate threats resulting from new vulnerabilities. This is not a 
trivial task to execute by hand given the size of the database and the rate of its growth 
- when a new vulnerability or exploit is discovered it is often critical to learn its scope 
by automatics means, as fast as possible. 
We have attained classification precision and recall rates of 70-80% for strongly 
populated categories and of approx. 50% or lower for less numerous categories. This 
are not ideal results, and in practice they would require further human intervention (ver-
ification and possibly reclassification). On the other hand, SVM classifiers have been 
proved numerous times to be an accurate mechanism for text data classification. The 
problem in our case lies with the data itself - neither CVE nor CPE contents provide 
enough specific data for the SVM to discern record categories. We can conclude that 
the vulnerability ontology should be extended to provide this additional information. 
Similar conclusions, although not directly related to IoT security, have been drawn by 
other researchers – e.g. in [36] the authors propose a unified security cybersecurity on-
tology that incorporates and integrates heterogeneous data and knowledge schemas 
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from different cybersecurity systems, including data about products and product ven-
dors. 
Finally, is also worth mentioning that the method used by us is not necessarily lim-
ited to CVE database, numerous other on-line vulnerability databases exists [37], which 
are managed by companies (e.g. Microsoft Security Advisories, TippingPoint Zero Day 
Initiative, etc.), national CERTs or by professionals’ forums (e.g. BugTraq, Exploit-
DB, and others). Information from various sources can be integrated and categorized 
by the method we proposed in this paper. This should increase the precision of the 
classification and is a topic of our further research. 
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